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I.
An independent judiciary which applies rules of law, whether the
laws are derived from old or relatively recent sources of values, is a
pain in the neck to any government that wants to get things done.
Whether the government is democratic or totalitarian, right-wing or
left-w-ing, courts get in the way. Courts are a great source of political
transaction costs-they create inertia when the government wants to
change course.
This is not solely an American phenomenon. In Italy, for exam-
ple, a newly elected government of the right is fighting with its magis-
trates, who persist in following their view of the law rather than carry-
ing out the policies of the new administration. One of the most
dramatic examples of this conflict in Italian history can be found in
the time of fascism, when Italian judges were formalists to a degree
unknown almost anywhere else in the world. In contrast to function-
alists, who make the law respond to certain societal ends, these for-
malists carried out old law and thereby preserved its values. Those
values, which were economically and politically libertarian values
from the nineteenth century, got in the way of fascism.
When traveling in Italy in the 1920s, Roscoe Pound could not un-
derstand why there were almost no serious scholars of law, from his
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point of view. All the scholars who were legal sociologists, like
Pound, who made the law do what the society wanted, were fascists.
All the people who seemed like serious scholars were making the law
consistent with what it had been a hundred years before, which to
Pound was madness. After the war ended, several great Italian schol-
ars said, "Now we can be functionalists, now that there's no longer a
dictatorship. We can make the law come to do what the society
wants." To which others said, "And what about the next dictator-
ship?"
While all courts do not seek to preserve an old order, they do get
in the way. Therefore, courts and judicial institutions will constantly
be under pressure to behave less like courts-to act less independ-
ently and be more responsive to the immediate needs of the majority.
There will also be pressures to take issues away from courts and give
them to bodies that will not be independent. When these pressures
escalate, conflict arises. There is then much at stake, but whatever
the outcome, at least it is an open and clean battle.
There have been many such struggles for control over the judici-
ary in the history of this country. Today, there are issues regarding
(a) the use of military commissions to deal with terrorist prosecutions
and (b) the removal of court jurisdiction over deportation cases. As
to these issues, whatever is decided, we can be fairly confident that
the polity has weighed the advantages and disadvantages of having
decisions made in a politically dependent rather than in a judicial
way. These debates raise questions analogous to those that my col-
league Bruce Ackerman has said arise in "constitutional moments,"1
those times when people act as "We the people" and can decide the
issues in fundamental, semi-constitutional ways.
Rather than these constitutional moments, I want to discuss situa-
tions in which for good practical reasons we have rejected courts as deci-
sion-makers or have made courts less independent as judicial deci-
sion-makers. In each case, there may be very sound grounds for
moving from an independent decision-maker to a dependent deci-
sion-maker. And, in isolation, each case may not amount to much.
The question remains, however, whether, in a variety of different ar-
eas, intentionally or by chance, we are increasingly giving power to
dependent decision-makers rather than independent ones and
whether together these shifts amount to a very significant change in
our system.




The first of the shifts that I want to discuss derives from the desire
to have equality in sentencing, a perfectly sensible aim. Anyone who
looked at how defendants were sentenced in federal court saw a de-
gree of disparity that was not acceptable in a society that desires
equality. One judge would throw the book at a defendant while an-
other would give the lightest possible sentence. Now, we have a sen-
tencing guideline system that greatly limits the degree to which
judges can determine the appropriate sentence. The guidelines are
not perfect and many judges, especially federal district judges accus-
tomed to independence, resent them. It is hard to say, however, that
there were not good reasons for the guidelines.
What has been the effect of the guidelines? Do we have equality
in sentencing, or have we simply turned over discretion, formerly the
province ofjudges, to prosecutors? Prosecutors have always had great
power in deciding how to charge somebody, but before the guide-
lines, if judges figured that prosecutors had erred, the judges could
use their enormous discretion in sentencing to remedy that error.
Judges would ultimately decide-perhaps unequally, perhaps un-
fairly, but independently-what the result would be. With sentencing
guidelines, judges no longer have that power, but we have done noth-
ing-nor perhaps can we do anything-to curb the analogous discre-
tion in people who instead are subject to political pressures. Is that
bad? I don't know; judges naturally get in the way of what the polity
wants. Regardless of whether it is or is not desirable, it is a change
from decisions made by people who are independent to decisions
made by people who are dependent.
Another example is the ascendancy of the expert in our increas-
ingly complicated society. Judges are generalists who deal with a va-
riety of matters and there are very good reasons why they should do
so. But breadth inhibits depth, so the idea that judges should defer
to experts is a perfectly sensible one. We judges are often told that
we should yield to the experts. We had a case before the Second Cir-
cuit recently in which we were asked to defer to the judgment of the
police commissioner and of the mayor in transferring a large group
of black policemen, on the basis of their race, into the precinct where
the Amadou Diallo incident had occurred.2 We were told that we
should not even consider whether this transfer met the requirements
of equal protection, or whether the move amounted to racial target-
ing, because the experts, who do know a lot in these situations, be-
lieved that the transfer was necessary. An analogous argument was
2 SeePatrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of NewYork, 74 F. Supp. 2d 321 (1999).
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made for deferring to the military in Korematsu.3 The "experts" there
told judges that it was necessary to intern Japanese-Americans in Cali-
fornia in order to defend the country, but the same military experts
declined to urge anything similar in Hawaii.
We often are told that judges should not second-guess the people
who run prisons, who are, after all, in the line of fire. In a case that I
heard, the experts told me that allowing prisoners to receive pictures
of their naked spouses would be dangerous to the security of the
prison, but allowing them to have photographs from pornographic
magazines would not.4  The experts did not give any explanation.
When I asked why, they just said "well, we know; we run prisons." I
can think of any number of reasons why the naked photos rule might
be right, but it might also be wrong. As a result, my tendency-typi-
cal of independent judges-was to ask the experts to explain their
reasons. I could then examine these reasons in the case before me,
and in other situations, and then decide whether the rule made
sense. Instead, the answer given to us was that judges cannot know
the details ofjail life and that we, therefore, should follow the experts
without questioning them. In all these cases, whether that deference
is right or not, it moves the decision from somebody who makes it in-
dependently to someone who may have reasons for pleasing the then-
majority or the then-power structure in making the rule.
A more generalized problem arises with administrative agencies
and the Chevron doctrine.5 Do we defer to the interpretations of stat-
utes by administrative agencies because such agencies are experts?
Chevron says we must, for good reasons; yet, administrative agencies-
whether they are dependent, like the Internal Revenue Service, or
independent, like the Federal Reserve-are still not independent in
the way that courts are independent. Agencies, in their statutory in-
terpretation, respond much more to majoritarian pressure than
courts do. Statutory interpretation under Chevron, like sentencing
guidelines and deferral to expert witnesses, moves the decision-
making from independent pains-in-the-neck to people who are more
functionalist.
The next shift away from an independent judiciary that I will men-
tion is explained in part by federalism, by the desire to let states be
truly sovereign. As ajudge I agree with this aim. I press for certifica-
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 236-37 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("Justifi-
cation for the exclusion is sought, instead, mainly upon questionable racial and sociological
grounds not ordinarily within the realm of expert military judgment, supplemented by certain
semi-military conclusions drawn from an unwarranted use of circumstantial evidence.").
4 Giano v. Senkowski, 54 F.3d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi,J., dissenting).
5 Chevron U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (holding that agencies may act within any permissible construction of the statutes they
administer, unless congressional intent is unambiguous).
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tion in diversity cases because I think federal courts generally are not
very good at deciding what state law is; when we try to tell New York
or Connecticut what their law is, we often get it wrong. As a result,
certification seems to me to be eminently sensible. But there have
been other, more troubling ways in which federalism has been used.
One example is the routing through state courts of cases in which the
issue ultimately is a federal one-whether, for example, a state rule
complies with a federal statute or the Federal Constitution. Such a
routing has the effect of getting district courts out of the business of
being fact finders. By letting cases go through the state system, sup-
posedly to be reviewed only by the Supreme Court of the United
States, the role of independent judges, is, for reasons I will give
shortly, substantially reduced. Of course, if genuine de novo review
of these cases by the Supreme Court were possible, we would still
have an independent tribunal reviewing state rules. But, given the
limited capacity of the Supreme Court to take such cases, let alone
review them fully if it were to take the cases, this is not, and cannot
be, the way it works.
The problem is made worse by a current requirement of defer-
ence to state court decisions that goes well beyond deference to fact-
finding. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA),6 federal courts must uphold state court decisions in habeas
cases on matters of federal law, even if the state decisions are errone-
ous, and even if they are unreasonable applications of a decision of
the lower federal courts. We can only reverse even unreasonable ap-
plications of federal laws if the state court ruling represents an unrea-
sonable application of a decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States.7 This means that for federal judges to reverse a decision made
by a state court, on a matter of federal law, we have to say that the
state courts read the United States Supreme Court unreasonably; not
just that they got it wrong. Obviously, we are reluctant to insult state
courts, and federalism, in this way. As a result, state courts frequently
have the last word in such cases.
One might respond, however, "this doesn't undercut judicial in-
dependence; it simply makes a different independent body decide-
state courts rather than federal courts." But this is incorrect because
most states have elected courts. We tend to think of all courts as be-
ing mini-Article III courts, yet this is not true across the country, es-
pecially at the trial and first appellate level. It follows that decisions
are being taken from relatively independent bodies, federal courts,
and given to relatively dependent state tribunals which, because
6 Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
See Pub. L. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1218 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1)
(1997)).
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elected, are much more likely to do what the then-majority wants.
Once again, this may, or may not, be a good thing, but either way it is
a move away from independence.
Another set of reasons for shifting issues away from federal courts
is to protect these courts from being overwhelmed. Congress has told
federal judges what things we should not do when dealing with pris-
oners in order to keep us from having too much to do.8 For example,
prisoners now must exhaust their claims in the state 0prison adminis-
trative system before they can bring a claim to court. The Supreme
Court unanimously decided this year that prisoners must exhaust
these claims even when the claim is one for damages that cannot be
awarded in the state system. ° That again means that all of the fact-
finding that is crucial to review is done by prison officials within the
prison, rather than by judicial officials in independent courts. I am
not saying that these prison tribunals are not doing their jobs well,
only that they are not independent, and so subject to pressures to
which courts are not.
Limits have also been put on writs of habeas corpus, so that peti-
tions must be brought within a year except in extraordinary cases"
and second habeas petitions are permitted only in very few circum-
stances.12 Judge Pollak and I, in Triestman, increased the circum-
stances slightly,14 but most of the time such review is not available.
Defenders of the new habeas corpus limitations argue that adminis-
trative pardons and similar measures will cure any injustices that
might arise. That is, of course, true. But once again, these proce-
dures are all in the hands of dependent and politically responsible
bodies, rather than independent and politically insulated courts.
8 On the other hand, for political reasons, Congress is constantly giving us more jurisdic-
tion over criminal acts that are already prohibited by existing state criminal laws. It is this pecu-
liar, parallel state/federal jurisdiction, rather than prison litigation, that is actually overwhelm-
ing us.
9 Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1321-71 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)).
10 Porter v. Nussle, No. 00-853, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 1373 (Feb. 26, 2002) ("Even when the pris-
oner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is
a prerequisite to suit.").
1 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, §§ 101, 106, 110
Stat 1217, 1220 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (1997)).
12 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (3) (E) (2002).
13 Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 1997).
14 Id. at 376 (holding that "'inadequate or ineffective' does not refer solely to practical limi-
tations on the petitioner's ability to obtain relief under § 2255," and that § 2241 review is avail-
able in those cases in which the absence of § 2241 consideration would result in serious consti-




There are other ways in which the independence of the courts has
been diminished that are even more subtle. The federal judiciary has
become something of a career judiciary. Most of the Justices of the
Supreme Court were court of appeals judges before their appoint-
ment to the High Court. In the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, a
majority of the judges were promoted from positions as district
judges. The effect of this professionalization has been to make our
court less ideological and our discussions more technical than if we
had federal judges coming primarily from the academy, politics, or
practice.
My own assessment is that, on our court, there is more difference
between judges, based on their previous jobs than on who nominated
them. Thus, those who were formerly district judges, regardless of
whether they were appointed by a Democrat or Republican, are very
similar to each other. In contrast, Calabresi and Winter, whose poli-
tics before they went on the court were very different, but who were
full-time academics, are much more like each other than those judges
who formerly were in private practice. And both former academics
and practitioners differ greatly from former trial judges.
It is highly beneficial to have this kind of diversity of experience
among judges and, for this, as well as many other reasons, career
judges are desirable. But there are also serious effects that flow from
having a significant part of the judiciary be made up of career magis-
trates. Fear of getting fired is not one of these effects. I do not think
that when federal judges make decisions that are unpopular, they
really think that they might lose their job. Judges still have as their
model, Oliver Wendell Holmes, who, when he got to the Supreme
Court of the United States decided a case in a way that offended
Theodore Roosevelt, the president who had appointed him. When
Theodore Roosevelt berated the Justice at a Washington cocktail
party, Holmes drew himself up to his full height, tweaked his mus-
tache, and said, "Now, Mr. President, you can go straight to hell."15 I
do not think judges worry much about getting impeached. There was
talk of impeaching Harold Baer, a district judge in our court,16 be-
cause of an unpopular decision but nobody took it truly seriously.
The real danger, instead, is that if judges think about promotion,
they are going to start being very careful not to make waves. If you
are a district judge and you want to get on the court of appeals, it
'5 Who knows if this oft repeated story is true. "Ma se non 6 vera ben trovata."
16 See Katharine Q. Seelye, House G.O.P. Begins Listing a Few Judges To Impeach, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 1997, at A24 (reporting that Representative Tom DeLay listed Judge Harold Baer as a
possible candidate for impeachment).
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does not help to have senators of the right or the left criticizing your
opinions; yet we want politicians to criticize opinions. Judges may not
like it, but opinions should be debated, criticized, and be part of the
political discussion. On the other hand, if that means that judges are
going to be afraid of making controversial decisions because they will
not be promoted, then we have seriously diminished judicial inde-
pendence.
17
Another related issue is the fact that as overworked judges we
need help. We have many clerks and we have help from the Adminis-
trative Office of the Courts. These may not seem to be dangerous
things, but they are.
In 1957, a young lawyer named Rehnquist wrote an article saying
that law clerks were dangerous left-wing influences on the Supreme
Court and that the way to deal with this problem was to have such
clerks be confirmed by the Senate.'8 I don't think the Chief Justice
would believe that today. A year later, I asked Justice Black, for whom
I was clerking, about this and he said, "No, I would never let a young
man"-this was some 44 years ago-"go through that. I was a senator
myself, I know what senators ask at confirmation hearings; they might
even ask about a clerk's sex life. With a young man, you can't have
something like that going on." With my usual self-importance, I
blurted out, "But what would you do, Judge?" He said, "I wouldn't
have any clerks. My opinions might be less learned and certainly
shorter, but I could handle it."
Of course I felt very embarrassed because Justice Black could eas-
ily have handled the whole job alone; he obviously didn't need clerks
at all. He, however, did not seem troubled by my gaffe, and instead
turned very serious. He said, "There's something important in this.
What makes courts independent isn't that we are here for life. Four-
teen or twenty years would be plenty if we couldn't be reappointed
and went on to other things. Instead, what makes us independent is
that there is nothing that anybody can do to us. I don't need any-
thing from anyone. My salary is fixed. If they take away my library, I
can go to any law school in D.C. to get what I need. The building is
nice, but I could decide cases almost anywhere. I want for very little.
Beware of people who under the guise of helping judges make judges
financially dependent. That's the difference between us and admin-
istrative agencies, even independent administrative agencies."
17 Regrettably, after ajournalist says that ajudge would be a good person to think about for
the Supreme Court, many ajudge, even on a court of appeals, start to dance. I once voiced this
concern to Bob Drinan, a Jesuit who is a law professor and former congressman. He put on a
fake Irish accent and said, "Sure, and we have the same thing in the church; we call it scarlet
fever," scarlet being the color worn by cardinals.
18 William H. Rehnquist, Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 13, 1957, at 74-75.
[Vol. 4.4
JUDICAL JNEPENDEWCE
As Justice Black reminded me, even independent administrative
agencies are dependent because they cannot do the job they are as-
signed without important budgetary support from the Congress. And
this means that such agencies have to make sure that key Congress
people are not too unhappy.
There has been a major change from the day when Justice Black
could do his work anywhere, with only two clerks whom he could do
without, to the situation today. Judges are now much more depend-
ent on our budget. The ChiefJustice speaks about it and the circuit
judges are very much aware of it. I do not think that any of us has
ever decided a case differently because of budget pressures, but I do
think that the way we have spoken-what we have said, and how rude
we are willing to be to Congress-has been affected by the fact that
nowadays judges need Congress to appropriate a not insignificant
amount of money for the judiciary.
IV.
Again, each of these is by itself relatively unimportant. And, you
might say, "this talk of dependence, what does it mean when we have
a Supreme Court which is still totally independent and which is as ag-
gressive a Supreme Court as has ever existed? It does not defer to
anybody and whether it's a right or a left Court doesn't, from this
point of view, matter. Why isn't that enough to maintain judicial in-
dependence?" The reason is that the Supreme Court cannot handle
most of the cases. It can only take a hundred, maybe if it worked
harder, two hundred cases. It could not possibly deal with all of the
issues that I have been talking about. That is why where one routes a
case, whether it goes through the federal courts or through the state
courts, is so important.
The same thing applies within a state court system. Certiorari ju-
risdiction explains why the Supreme Court takes very few cases. State
certiorari rules also explain why the New York Court of Appeals, for
instance, hears mighty few cases that involve a significant federal con-
stitutional or statutory question. The decisions at the state level are
made almost always by the intermediate appellate courts, which are
subject to much more political pressure and have much less inde-
pendence than the state's highest courts. Just as in our system the
Supreme Court ultimately cannot deal with a high volume of cases, so
the same is true in the states. The result is that, with certiorari juris-
diction, we have the illusion, the myth of independence based on re-
view by "Supreme Courts," but that such review does not suffice to de-
fend true independence.
Is all this really that serious? Each of the examples I have given-
and I could give more-is a small thing. I come from New Haven, a
town I love. It's a beautiful city, but it is not as beautiful as it once
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was. In 1900, New Haven had more eighteenth century houses than
any city in the United States other than Charleston, South Carolina.
Unlike Charleston, none of the houses were terribly important. They
were scattered eighteenth century farmhouses, each of which was not
worth saving when there was a good reason for taking it down. Today
there are only two, maybe three such houses left in the city of New
Haven. Similarly, each of these reasons, each of these instances of
limitations on judicial independence, is well justified. Put them to-
gether, however, and you start to see a significant change.
How significant? I have tried to figure out how much of our
docket is actually in these areas where deference or routing or some
other mechanism of dependence has become important. It is hard to
say, but if one subtracts those cases that have no particular political or
ideological significance, the cases in which being a pain-in-the-neck
does not matter, and one leaves only the others, these areas become
an important part of our docket.
The changes I have described may be intentional, or they may not
be. Once there is a good reason for a policy of deference or routing,
some people will support that policy in part because they see the pol-
icy as an opportunity to improve their ability to influence results by
getting rid of pain-in-the-neckjudges. I do not mean "intentional" in
the sense of a legislator or a member of the executive being primarily
motivated by the desire to eliminate federal courts, as is the case with
the creation of military commissions,' 9 or with targeted deprivations
of'jurisdiction. ° If they were that intentional, we would react in ways
that would make of the proposed change a constitutional moment, a
matter of discussion through which we could decide, "Do we want in-
dependence, or don't we?" They are not quite that way, and yet I
don't think these changes are purely accidental. They are happening
too often.
V.
Independence isn't always good. It brings inertia and political
transaction costs, which at some level outweigh the benefits of inde-
pendence. This is the Owen Roberts Lecture. Whether it is true or
not, Roberts is famous as the "switch in time that saved nine.,2 ' He is
19 See, e.g., Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Ter-
rorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) (authorizing the creation of military tribunals to try
suspected terrorists).
20 See, e.g., S. 158, 97th Cong. (1981) (attempting to limit jurisdiction of federal courts in
cases involving abortion); H.R. 3225, 97th Cong. (1981) (same).
21 See generally Michael Nelson, The President and the Court: Reinterpreting the Court-Packing Epi-
sode of 1937, 103 POL SC. Q. 267, 291 (1988); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)
(indicating thatJustice Roberts began to change his mind).
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famous because he is said to have yielded-not at the beginning, but
at a certain point-to political pressure. Independentjudges are not
totally independent. Dooley famously said that courts follow the elec-
tion returns.2 Perhaps judges do this, but if so we do it in a different
way from politicians or bureaucrats. After the New Deal had both es-
tablished itself and re-established itself, Roberts may have understood
that even independent courts must at a certain point yield to some
extent, that they probably should not be as independent as in our my-
thology we say that they are. And this is so, in part at least, to save the
independence of the judiciary.
"The switch in time" is only half of why justice Roberts is so impor-
tant to the topic of this Lecture, however. Owen Roberts was also one
of the few dissenters in Korematsu.2s Owen Roberts was one of the Jus-
tices who said we need not, must not, and cannot simply defer. He
stood up against what was one of the worst decisions in Supreme
Court history, made because-as Justice Black said to me-this was
war and who were we to stand in the way of the generals?
Thus, Owen Roberts symbolized in his life both the relative nature
of the independence of an independent judiciary and the crucial im-
portance of a judiciary that does not defer, that is independent, and
therefore has the power to make decisions that run counter to outra-
geously popular demands. Justice Roberts represents why we must be
on guard, lest by chopping down one unimportant eighteenth cen-
tury house after another, we find ourselves with none left at all.
MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 26 (1901) ("[No matter whether th' constitution follows th' flag
or not, th' supreme coort follows th' iliction returns.").
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225 (1944) (Roberts,J., dissenting).
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